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Suzana B. Rodrigues is Professor of International Business and Organization at the Strategy
Department, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and Scientific Director of
the Erasmus Centre for Emerging Economies [ECEE]. Her research focus on understanding inter -
na tional business in emerging economies, with particular reference to Brazilian multinationals
and small firms, and their relationships with local and host countries. Prior to joining Erasmus
University, Suzana was Professor of International Management and Organization at UFMG, Brazil
and at Birmingham University, UK. She is a visiting fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge and
visiting scholar at FUMEC University, Brazil. Suzana received the Terry Book Award from the AOM
for an outstanding contribution to management knowledge. She has published several books
and articles in peer reviewed journals in international business, corporate governance and
organization studies. 
The focus of this lecture is on the relationships between firms and governments and their
respective bargaining power in their strategy to access foreign market. It suggests that these
relationships can take different forms depending on the configuration taken by host environ -
ments, (i.e. combination of government and institutional maturity). Host country environments
that are characterized by political stability and institutional maturity offer less opportunities for
idiosyncratic relationships between firms and governments, while environments defined by
weak institutions and unstable governments present the fertile ground for political inter -
ference in business strategies. The lecture concludes by comparing large firms with small and
medium-sized firms, which despite having little bargaining power on their own, may be
capable to enhance their position in foreign markets through inter-organizational relations
with other firms and institutions. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder zoek -
 school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School
of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by ERIM is
focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm rela -
tions, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management contain written texts of inaugural addres -
ses by members of ERIM. The addresses are available in two ways, as printed hardcopy
booklet and as digital fulltext file through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal.
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Samenvatting
Richting een Nieuwe Agenda voor de Studie naar International Business:
Het integreren van Markten, Instituties en de Politiek - Suzana B. Rodriguez
Het zakenleven wordt steeds internationaler van aard.Tegelijkertijd mengen
regeringen zich steeds meer in de gedragingen van bedrijven. Een andere ont -
wikkeling is het groeiende belang van ontwikkelende economieën, waarvan
velen een lange traditie van actieve overheidsbemoeienis kennen. Deze ontwik -
kelingen samengenomen maken het zeer noodzakelijk om de relatie tussen
bedrijven en hun institutionele context te begrijpen. Conventionele theorieën
hebben vaak een te gerationaliseerd beeld van deze relaties binnen de inter -
nationale handel. Hun apolitieke perspectief mist het feit dat bedrijven poli -
tieke relaties met regeringen en instituties in binnen- en buitenland moeten
opbouwen om hun internationale activiteiten op te bouwen en te handhaven.
Het doel van deze lezing is om een alternatief perspectief te ontwikkelen
betreffende de internationalisering van kleine en grote bedrijven.Dit beschouwt
hoe multinationals internationale posities verkrijgen door onderhandelings -
macht uit te oefenen over buitenlandse regeringen. SME’s daarentegen zijn
vaak te klein en hebben te weinig capaciteiten om direct met buitenlandse
regeringen in contact te komen, en zijn vaak gedwongen om internationalisatie
te bereiken door te netwerken met andere SME’s, plaatselijke gemeenschappen
en ondersteunende agentschappen door verschillende vormen van sociale
innovatie. De conclusie van deze lezing is dat politieke en sociale perspectieven
op innovatie nieuwe wegen openen in het veld van international business.
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Abstract
Towards a New Agenda for the Study of Business Internationalization:
Integrating Markets, Institutions and Politics - Suzana B. Rodrigues
Business is becoming increasingly international. At the same time, govern -
ments are intervening more in the conduct of business. A further development
is the growing significance of emerging economies, many of which have a
tradition of active government involvement with business.Taken together,these
trends make it imperative to understand the relationships between firms and
their institutional contexts. Conventional theories adopt an over-ratio nalized
view of these relationships international business. Their apolitical perspective
misses the fact that in order to build and maintain international operations,
firms need to develop political relations with governments and institutions in
home countries and abroad.
The aim of this lecture is to develop an alternative perspective with parti -
cular reference to the internationalization of firms, large and small. This consi -
ders how multinationals gain international positions through bargaining power
with foreign governments. By contrast, SMEs face liabilities in dealing with
foreign governments and instead often have to achieve internationalization
through networking with other SMEs, with domestic communities and support
agencies via various forms of social innovation. The lecture concludes that
political and social innovation perspectives open new research avenues in the
field of international business.
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1. Introduction
Dear Rector Magnificus of the Erasmus University,
Dear Dean of Rotterdam School of Management,
Dear family, friends, colleagues, students and other members of the audience,
The title of my talk today is Towards a new agenda for the study of busi ness
internationalization: integrating markets, institutions and politics, and I open
with two quotes to help set the framework for my talk. The first is from the film
The White Countess (2005), in which the character Tod Jackson, played by Ralph
Fiennes, observes: 
“Without the political dimension, this establishment would be nothing
more than a confection”.
The second is taken from Boddewyn and Brewer (1994: 125) in an article on
international business political behaviour for the Academy of Management
Review:
“It is precisely the existence of sovereignties (states, governments), which
rule distinct political economies, together with the concomitant assertion of
governmental controls and of business devices to avoid or exploit them, that
distinguishes ‘international’ from ‘domestic’ business.”    
The first asserts that any vision of organizations which neglects politics is
amorphous; the process which gives it momentum and coherence is missing.
The second reminds us that all international business involves relationships
between firms and foreign governments. The central theme of my lecture,
therefore, is that in accessing foreign markets and investment opportunities,
firms rely on the cooperation of host country governments and institutions, and
must therefore manage their relationships, whether directly or indirectly, with
them.  I make this distinction between direct and indirect relationships because,
while some firms (usually large multinationals) have the status to establish
direct relationships with foreign governments, others have less power to do so,
while others again (mainly the small ones) have none whatsoever. As we shall
see, however, even firms with little initial influence can develop their capacity to
negotiate with governments in innovative ways. 
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In short, I would argue that the relations between firms on the one hand, and
national/international governments and institutions on the other, should be at
the forefront of international business studies. Key in these relations is the
extent to which each party can influence the agenda of the other.
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2. Setting the international business scene
The context of business operations today is becoming increasingly global,
with more and more organizations extending their activities abroad. The recent
financial crisis, however, has diminished both public and political confidence in
the ability of firms to govern themselves responsibly and of markets to provide
adequate sanctions to ensure good corporate governance. The past ten years
have thus witnessed increasing government intervention in this regard, in
response to a growing demand for accountability. 
At the same time, emerging economies have benefited from an increasing
share of world GDP, world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). These
economies are characterized by a closer relationship between business and
governments than western developed economies tend to exhibit. In China and
Russia, for example, the authorities not only negotiate with other governments
on behalf of firms, but encourage their large strategic enterprises to enter
particular markets. There are precedents for this in previously emerging
economies such as Japan and South Korea. In the case of China, its government
had until recently maintained a policy of strong incentives to attract inward FDI.
It now takes the view that such investment is no longer so vital for the country,
which means that multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in China do not
occupy such a favourable position as before. In other emerging economies,
governments also play a significant role in the internationalization of small
firms. In Brazil, for example, the government has gone further than merely
promoting exports by stimulating such social innovations as new forms of
collective organization among small firms, thus facilitating their effective
engagement in international trade. 
We can thus identify some major trends:
• Business is becoming increasingly international
• Governments are becoming increasingly interventionist
• Emerging economies are playing an increasing role in international business.
In addition, they are establishing a tradition of active government involve -
ment with business. 
Taken together, they show why, in order to understand the relationship
between firms and governments, we need to adopt a political perspective in
addition to the primarily economic ones we have come to rely on. 
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This naturally raises the question as to whether existing perspectives on inter -
national business take proper account of the political dimension. I would argue
in this lecture that they do not and that further research is vital, with particular
reference to the international evolution of the firm. After reviewing existing
perspectives, I will discuss the close involvement of firms with institu tions,
primarily governmental agencies, and how these relationships contribute to the
internationalization process.
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3. Conventional theories of internationalization
Theories of the international evolution of the firm comprise several selective
strands, in which certain phenomena are highlighted while others are ignored.
For around 35 years, the economic and behavioural perspectives have held sway:
the former emphasizes, inter alia, transaction costs, resources and firm-specific
advantages, while the latter focuses on the mode and timing of internationali -
zation. I would suggest that these conventional approaches do not reveal the
nuances of the processes by which firms become international and, in particu -
lar, the way in which they negotiate the conditions for operating in foreign
countries. In particular, they present an over-rationalistic view of internationali -
zation which underestimates the role played by political strategies by firms in
their endeavour to gain markets across borders.   
The economic perspective 
In its early days, the field of international business studies achieved
distinction by drawing attention to the attraction of foreign markets in contrast
to the risks imposed by domestic competition and, in some countries, to the
limited size of home markets (Hymer 1976, Vernon 1966). The view propounded
was that some firms are able to build monopolistic advantage abroad through
developing specific products and processes desirable to the markets in their
targeted host country. Successful firms may enjoy advantages in terms of
comparative costs, establishing production processes that are cheaper to
operate than at home, yet superior to those in place in host countries. Buckley
and Casson (1976) advanced the economic perspective by analyzing the factors
that distinguish MNCs from other firms. They introduced the concept of
‘internalization’ – the capacity of a firm to secure advantages by bringing under
its control operations normally pursued through market transactions. MNCs
also have the capacity to expand by creating subsidiaries abroad. Growth in this
way safeguards proprietary knowledge, although the firm will only expand as
long as the benefits of further internalization exceed the cost. 
The eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1980) has the great merit of drawing
together elements of previous theories to identify the advantages of ownership,
location and internalization (OLI) that motivate internationalization. Thus,
ownership advantages (command of resources), the capacity to exploit opportu -
nities abroad through internal organization and the market attracti veness of
foreign locations are factors that foster the development of multinational enter -
prises. Though Dunning (2003) had since recognised that firms from developing
countries go abroad as a way to overcome comparative disadvantages, the
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economic perspective, which is still very influential, has primarily drawn upon
the experience of large western enterprises that developed a strong domestic
base before internationalization. 
The predominant assumption in economic theory has been that internatio -
na li zation is motivated by the desire to exploit existing ownership advantages.
Yet, as noted above, many firms go abroad in the search for assets, in particular
those from developing economies. This point has been discussed in an article by
Child and Rodrigues (2005) on the internationalization of Chinese firms.  MNCs
from emerging economies suffer significant disadvantages in comparison with
firms in developed countries, e.g. outdated technology, heavy reliance on
expatriate workers, limited knowledge of overseas markets and, with a few
exceptions, the lack of internationally known brands or trade names (Yip 2000).
The “latecomer perspective” (Mathews 2002) is significant in this regard, in
pointing out international investment as a means of addressing competitive
disadvantage and catching up on expertise. 
The economic view is informed by neo-classical thinking, not only in its core
assumptions but also its limitations, one of which is that markets are free to
operate autonomously, in environments friendly to the strategic intent of the
players. This, however, overlooks the fact that firms are in practice subject to all
kinds of restrictions, sometimes imposed by other powerful firms but more
generally by governments through laws and regulations. Furthermore, this
approach presumes rationality on the part of firms, an assumption that does
not fully apply in a world that can be constrained by several factors such as
public opinion and nationalism, which frequently translate into politics. 
It is also noteworthy that the economic perspective plays up the rationality
of the firm at the expense of its embeddedness in its wider society. Indeed, by
definition it tends to view the subject primarily through an economic rather
than a social or political lens. Yet, the way in which business carves out its place
in society is historically constituted. Each country brings into play diverse and
contradictory ‘contextual rationalities’, with which multinationals have to nego -
tiate (Dorrenbacher and Geppert 2010).
Developing and transitional economies are typically characterized by active
governmental involvement in business, through both ownership and regulation
(Peng 2000). This is certainly the case in China. China in the literal sense remains
a political economy, despite its development of a market system. Nolan (2001:
193) maintains that large strategic Chinese firms, “without continued state
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support… were most unlikely to be able to build on their considerable entre -
preneurial achievements, and mount a serious challenge to the global giants in
their respective sectors”. For example, the central authorities have intervened to
limit domestic mergers and acquisitions, while fees and other transaction costs
are imposed in an arbitrary and often illegal fashion by local authorities (Huang
2003; Meyer and Lu 2004; Nolan 2001). With regard to internationalization, it is
significant to note the ways that the national governments of major emerging
economies have been actively supporting, and in cases like China actually
directing, outward FDI by their strategic firms. 
A major weakness of the conventional economic perspective lies in the fact
that, for many years, investigation has primarily focused on multinationals.
Until recently, small firms have generally been bracketed off from mainstream
studies in a separate domain usually referred to as ‘international entrepreneur -
ship’. When attention is paid to these firms, however, it becomes evident that,
despite being light on resources, they can become international by taking
advantage of new marketing and delivery modes offered by modern informa -
tion and communication technologies (Ojala 2009). For example, while large
firms can usually establish social relations directly with host-country organiza -
tions, a small firm will rely on mediation by agents and partners instead (Child,
Rodrigues and Frynas 2009) and/or joining a cooperative (Hendrikse 2008).
Small firms can also construct forms of social organization that build bridges
with foreign markets. Although viewing the internationalization of small firms
from an entrepreneurial perspective may make sense, segmenting the evidence
of large and small firms does not, as it creates a barrier to coherent theory
building.  
The behavioural perspective
The behavioural perspective is usually seen as distinct from the economic
perspective because of its focus on process. In the latter view, choices of location
are influenced by perceptions of the difficulties and uncertainties associated
with foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). These perceptions can be
informed by experience, as well as by a lack of information on particular
markets. The choices of firms are thus made in a context of bounded rationality,
if not outright misconception. The ‘psychic distance’ of a firm, real or imagined,
is seen to influence its choice of foreign markets to enter, with the first invest -
ment likely to be in those places perceived to present the lowest level of risk.
According to this perspective, firms grow their international operations through
gradually enhancing their commitment to their chosen markets and learning to
cope with uncertainties. 
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Through a study with colleagues (Child, Rodrigues and Frynas 2009) I have
contributed to the behavioural view of internationalization by investigating
British small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) entering the Brazilian
market. Our thesis is that differences in perception are not as important for
actual behaviour (market entry or exit) as the capacity of firms to cope with
differences in the foreign market. Firms are more or less likely to access markets
perceived as difficult environments according to how skilful they are in coping
with factors that they cannot change, such as the legal system, language and
cultural constraints. I have also collaborated with a colleague, Linda Hsieh, in
advancing conceptions of the environment by investigating perceptions of risk
and opportunism by decision makers, together with the kinds of internal
adjustment made by a firm in its attempt to maintain collaborative arrange -
ments in foreign countries. This study, primarily based on Linda’s work on
Taiwanese joint-ventures, led us to examine in greater detail the issue of
repairing trust in international alliances (Hsieh, Rodrigues and Child 2010)
Another project to which I contributed concerns the internationalization of
Brazilian SMEs in the clothing sector and the issue of ‘irrationality’ in their
attempts to reach foreign markets. This research by Rene Seifert has taught us
that, although the resources perspective has the potential to explain why firms
internationalize, it cannot explain fully why some firms do not become
international (Seifert, Child and Rodrigues 2010). We found that many
entrepreneurs prefer to work in their ‘comfort zone’ and simply do not have the
ambition to grow internationally. There is more to bounded rationality than
simply limitations of knowledge. Foreign markets may not be part of the entre -
preneurial mindset. Though some firms may have specific advantages to
explore abroad, they may also identify strongly with the local community, which
may be uninterested in foreign expansion. Such firms may suffer from
‘insidership’, which involves the extent to which their immediate network has
developed a sustainable export business and connections abroad. As Johanson
and Vahlne (2009) suggest, the motivation of a firm to internationalize emerges
in the context of insidership: i.e. the kind of activities and contacts that are
developed and valued in networks. ‘Outsidership’ is viewed as a liability that
prevents a firm engaging in local and international networks.
An interesting way in which Johanson and Vahlne (2009) have reformulated
their concept of business environments is through the idea of developing
opportunities. In their previous work, the Uppsala group to which they belong
introduced the notion of ‘psychic distance’ and by so doing has (1) unpacked the
components of the foreign environment, previously understood in a monolithic
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way; (2) introduced the recognition of psychic distance, thereby implying that
foreign environments comprise not only objective but also subjective dimen -
sions, in that entrepreneurs see entry into foreign markets as posing different
degrees of difficulty. Relationships are considered important in terms of
modifying initial perceptions; they can be a source of new information and also
mediate any risks identified in the foreign environment through factors such as
trust and commitment. Moreover, if firms through their network are able to
develop opportunities in foreign markets, this may mitigate the threats posed
by these environments. This reformulated conception of the business environ -
ment accords with our findings that the perception of context is closely
associated with the capacity of a firm to manage the difficulties that it sees as
belonging to that environment.    
Some of the limitations of the behavioural approach lie in the under -
developed view of network dynamics. I would argue that, despite the recent
advances in their thinking, Johanson and Vahlne have still not gone deeply
enough into the dynamics of insidership and outsidership and have missed the
opportunity of enhancing these concepts by drawing from theories of social and
political capital. Their perspective on network dynamics treats knowledge
creation as unproblematic, in that it overlooks conflicts of interest in relation -
ships. It only considers business-to-business relationships and ignores those
between firms and institutions.
Yet it is unrealistic to assume that all theories have equally to meet the
criteria of comprehensiveness. These limitations are minor considering the
relevance of the contribution of the behavioural approach, which (1) presents a
framework that links choices, processes and outcomes; (2) emphasises the role of
relational frameworks (networks); and (3) maps key dimensions of the business
environment and draws attention to the role played by actors’ perceptions of
this environment. 
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4. Integrating markets, institutions and politics to
understand the evolution of the international
firm 
I have argued that firms evolve into international forms not only through the
rational processes of choosing appropriate locations but also through ‘relational
frameworks’. This term was first coined by Scott and Meyer (1983) to designate
relations between firms and institutions. I use it to indicate the relationships,
both internal and external to the firm, which are relevant to its international
evolutionary process. These relationships not only include the firm’s central
stakeholders but also those actors with which the firm has a direct or indirect
interdependence, such as governments and their institutions, competitors and
collaborators, and communities in local and host countries. Hadjikhani, Lee and
Ghauri (2008) suggest that multinationals are embedded in networks formed
by “socio-political actors”, whose relationships are interdependent and interest-
based and whose dynamics involve trust and legitimacy. These socio-political
actors are usually simultaneously engaged in several power frameworks, some
of which may be sponsored by large firms and/or serve to connect them in
collective action such as lobbying governments. As Barley (2010) also suggests,
American corporations have created several organizations with the purpose of
coordinating and articulating ideologies and the advocacy of their interests to
governments. 
The evolution of firms towards internationalization is largely fostered by
government policies and intervention, but is also determined by firm initiatives
to affect such policies and the business environment (Volberda and Lewin 2003;
Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer 1999). The possibility of inter-action
between firms and their business environment, rather than just re-action by
firms, raises the further question of what international ‘co-evolution’ may
signify. A co-evolutionary perspective emphasises the fact that firms are not
passive recipients of environmental pressure but can in fact modify this
environ ment and even shape the constitution of markets (Fligstein 2001;
Rodrigues and Child 2008a). 
My research on the co-evolution of Brazilian telecommunications company
Telemig (Rodrigues and Child 2003; Rodrigues and Child 2008a; Rodrigues and
Child 2008b) has shown that large firms are able to shape markets through
influencing the process of institution formation, including the establishment of
their boundaries. This happened at several points in the company’s lifecycle,
particularly at times of institutional transition and the redistribution of
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political power through revisions in the national constitution. These turning
points created opportunities for the company to influence both its restructuring
and that of its industry. During its inception in the early 1970s, Telemig joined
with the army and bureaucratic elite to create an ‘institutional field’ for tele -
communications (Scott 1995). Senior executives, a few suppliers – subsidiaries of
multinationals already in the country – and bureaucrats came together to
define the rules of procurement and even the overall institutional framework
for telecommunications. Telemig also influenced the sector through its exper -
tise and reputation, by establishing standards that became the industry
benchmark. When Brazil started to open its economy to foreign players, Telemig
initiated a movement for privatization. This mobilized actors internal and exter -
nal to the company, including ministries, senior bureaucrats and MNCs (both
established and recent entrants to the market). This interest group was parti -
cularly active during Brazil’s institutional transition in the mid-1990s.  It shaped
the regulatory body that today governs the provision of telecommunications
services in the country. This study showed that the way in which firms secure
niches in markets is largely permeated by power relations of various kinds. These
involve social and political processes, such as influencing governments through
lobbying, and by interlocking power positions in government and the company.
The findings of this research drew my attention back to an issue that motivated
the research I undertook in the early days of my career: power and politics within
and between organizations (Rodrigues and Hickson 1995; Rodrigues and
Collinson 1995) 
Attention to co-evolution has been high on the agenda of RSM’s Strategy
Department for some time, through the work of Volberda and Van den Bosch
(Volberda and Lewin 2003; Van den Bosch et al 1999).  What I bring to this agenda
is the political analysis of how firms evolve into international markets, which
necessarily pays attention to the power of firms to influence local and host
environments. This also means bringing other actors onto the stage, analyzing
their roles in the story of firms and seeking a better understanding of the
interplay between them and their wider context. In order to capture this
complex ‘stage scenario’ – actors in their relational frameworks – we need to
understand their respective objectives, interests and patterns of influence. Here,
both institutional and bargaining power theory have an important contribution
to make. 
The institutional perspective recognizes that government, through both the
legal system and public bureaucracies, has a role in the internationalization of
firms, through its connection with both inward and outward FDI as well as trade.
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Governments establish constraining regulations and may also offer incentives
that bear upon the operations of foreign firms within their domain (Hall and
Soskice 2001). Governments may facilitate the internationalization of domestic
firms through technical and political assistance, undertaking lobbying activities
and inter-government negotiation. A consequence of supportive policies is the
significant increase in foreign acquisitions by Russian and Chinese firms in the
last decade (WIR 2009). In Russia there has been sometimes seemingly arbitrary
government intervention on FDI, in which the state has played a greater role,
while in China the sheer amount of inward FDI and its declining strategic
relevance has led the government to revise its regulations to protect the
indigenous Chinese brands. As stated before, regulatory change is largely a
consequence of changes in the relevance of FDI for the development of China.
The country no longer requires so much inward investment because it now has
huge financial reserves and, in many sectors, technological requirements have
been met. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities have come to adopt an
increasingly active role in promoting and guiding outward FDI by Chinese firms.
Traditionally, the literature on international business has treated the MNC
as an almighty agent that is capable through its “corporate immune system”
(Birkinshaw and Ridderstrale 1999) of domesticating foreign territories and
actors, primarily owing to the attractiveness of their distinctive capabilities. In
conventional analyses, institutions were treated as background features, contri -
buting to the friendliness or risk of the business environment (Henisz and Zelner
2005). Without meaning to undervalue the level of sophistication already
achieved by current theory, I would highlight the political dimension of
institutions. This means that creating and maintaining an institutional
framework which is favourable to inward and outward foreign investors is
fundamentally a political decision by government, with resource allocation
implications. Such decisions are highly relevant to firms and their appropriation
of value abroad. A very recent example is that of British firms threatening to
relocate abroad if the government does not introduce more favourable tax
conditions. Witt and Lewin (2007) call this institutional movement “escapism”.
The example provided by these authors is that of a firm engaged in a ‘round trip’,
in order to obtain the advantages of being re-classified as a foreign investment
and obtaining preferential treatment at home after relocating its head office
elsewhere. As I will show later, firms and governments habitually try to influence
each other to modify and reverse decisions in their favour using the most
sophisticated weapons (Child, Elbanna and Rodrigues 2010). Firms and govern -
ments activate different sources of bargaining power, with greater or less
intensity depending on the institutional context. Inconsistent attitudes on the
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part of governments with regard to policies and sanctions may create instability
for firms and zones of friction, with implications for the kind of political strategy
that these actors may adopt.   
The mutual influence of governments and firms
Relationships between governments and firms are highly complex. Not only
do they imply calculating, self-interested intentions by parties but they also
occur in a context of power asymmetry, in which one party possesses resources
that the other desires. Organization theory has, for some time, wrestled with the
question of how much power an organization has vis-à-vis external actors and
under what conditions (Hickson et al 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Oliver 1991).
Bargaining power derives from the ability to withhold resources the other party
wants. The way in which firms and governments use bargaining power to
influence each other is an issue which has been recognized in organization theory
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). It posits that having superior resources endows the
organization with power to make others, in the external environment, act in a
manner they would not otherwise have done. Thus, an organization will be more
powerful in relation to external actors if it can mobilize their desired resources,
information, technology, finance and relations. To use a well-known simplistic
model, power is exercised in a context of dependence, in which A can mediate or
withhold resources needed by B. Alternatively, A and B can be interdependent,
insofar as each can mediate resources for the other. 
As this framework can be used to explain relationships between organiza -
tions and governments,it has come to the fore in international business theories
when analysing the adaptation and performance of multinationals in host
countries (Moon and Lado 2000; Kostova, Roth and Dacin 2008; Bouquet and
Birckinshaw 2008; Blumentritt 2008). This raises two issues. The first concerns
whether relationships between governments and firms can be cooperative or
whether they are primarily conflictive in nature (Moon and Lado 2000; Kostova
and Zaheer 1999). The findings to date appear inconclusive, which perhaps is
only natural since relationships with host countries are unique. Relationships
between actors in this context can be affected by factors of different nature, in
which outcomes are defined through the interplay of political forces with
economic pressures. 
It may be that large firms aiming for a large market share or monopoly
power abroad will try to influence host governments as a matter of course, to
secure comparative advantage (Frynas, Melhah and Pigman 2006). The
argument for conflictive relations comes from the reasoning that firms and
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governments have different interests and goals (Eden, Lenway and Schuler
2004). While government policy is formally geared to the interests of political
constituencies, MNC strategy is more narrowly focused on shareholder interests.
Governments typically pursue broader economic, social and political objectives
whereas business goals are highly specific: for example, increasing market share
and gaining favourable returns from investment in foreign locations. Thus
government policy may reflect a nationalistic aim to secure greater benefits
from FDI, such as encouraging the development of local industry, technology
transfer, employment and a positive balance of payments (Eden et al 2004).
Earlier research has flagged the possibility of power obsolescence. The theory
of obsolescent bargaining argues that, over time, multinationals tend to lose
their bargaining power with governments. This is due to increasing competition
in the foreign market, the improved capacity of governments to negotiate, and
the enhancement of indigenous competencies in host countries. Obsolescent
power in this case reflects the reduced dependency of governments on multi -
nationals and the increasing fragility of the latter’s bargaining power. The
theory furthermore asserts the possibility of increasing vulnerability of the
MNC, which can culminate in assets expropriation (Vernon 1980; Kobrin 1987). 
I would argue that multinationals may become exposed, not so much from
declining comparative advantage in their chosen markets, but because of
changes in the context of operation within the host countries, for example
through intensified competition from local firms. When governments suffer
internal pressures they feel obliged to respond, in ways that do not necessarily
converge with the competitive interests of foreign companies. The governments
of emerging economies in particular face pressure to subsidize local firms; they
can also impose specific development orders on multinationals as they enter the
country and even retrospectively, affecting firms already established there. In
some cases, multinationals lose legitimacy for their claims with governments
because the insistence to exploit obsolete technique and products in host
countries or because of a policy that insists on outsourcing globally when
governments intend to develop local capacity.  
There are, however, also many cases in which multinationals develop
cooperative relations with host-country governments. This largely depends on
the individual skills of local managers and whether they have delegated powers
to negotiate and facilitate the exchange of complementary resources. As Frynas
et al. (2006) suggest, multinationals can achieve their goals through helping
governments attain their developmental objectives. This is illustrated by my
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current research with colleagues (Child, Rodrigues and Tse 2010), which
investigates the basis of power of both firms and governments. Drawing on the
case study of YICT, now China’s largest container port (Tse 2009), we explore how
the foreign firm, Hutchinson Port Holdings, and Chinese government agencies
have influenced each other’s policies and practices in the process of establishing
YICT as a foreign owned infrastructure company in China and, in the process,
learned to work together.  One of the contributions of this study is to understand
bargaining power as being relational, rather than a property. This signifies that
bargaining power shifts according to the matter in hand and as each party
begins to understand the agendas and priorities of the other. We demonstrate
that reciprocity is a political weapon that although not well understood in the
West, is a very important mechanism for trust building in business collabo -
rations in the East.      
We also suggest that the framework proposed by French and Raven (1960) is
appropriate for understanding the power relations between firms and govern -
ments, because it addresses the nature of power as well as its sources. They
advance a classification of  “the bases of social power”, which considers a range
of sources from material to symbolic: (1) possession of material resources, which
provide “the ability to reward”; (2) coercion, which can include force and also the
withholding of reward; (3) legitimation, whereby the exercise of power is
regarded as rightful by all parties; (4) reference, in which the basis of a person’s or
unit’s power lies in the identification of others with the power-holder; and (5)
expertise,  whereby the expertise held by, or attributed to, a person creates a
willingness to accept his or her authority. 
Bargaining power in international markets
As suggested, relationships between firms and governments are extremely
dynamic, with multiple factors intervening. The outcomes of such relationships
are difficult to predict but still consequential, i.e. undesirable and unexpected
action by one part may generate a reaction of similar significance by the other.
Public policy makers can increase or decrease the power of firms in the market -
place through a number of policies and interventions, such as reducing or
increasing barriers to entry and exit, or by imposing environmental and quality
standards. Furthermore, governments may alter the size of markets through
purchasing decisions that create alternative markets for complementary products
(Hillman and Hitt 1999). In societies with strong centralized states like China and
Russia, governments can also exert significant sanctions over even large firms
through controlling business licenses, introducing tariffs and imposts, and even
initiating criminal proceedings against them. 
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Thus the international business environment is not one of passive acceptance of
rules and regulations; it is a volatile arena, encompassing actors whose objec -
tives are highly complex and politically bound. Multinationals do not simply
comply. Their activities may impact on issues that are strategic for the state, such
as levels of employment and investment. They have bargaining power through
the resources they bring to host countries and the threat of their withdrawal.
They can form cartels and collude with competitors. Governments and multi -
nationals are thus players in a political theatre, with policy outcomes largely
dependent on each other’s bargaining power and negotiation skills, including
the ability to mobilize support for their respective strategies (Boddewyn, 1988;
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). 
Governments affect multinationals right from the start of their first contact
with the host country, by regulating conditions for entry. For example, the
Chinese government for a long time formally encouraged inward foreign invest -
ment through joint ventures, as a means to encourage technology transfer and
learning through partnership, but it has been noted that the strictness of that
ruling varies according to an individual firm’s relationship with the government
(Huang 2003). The Brazilian environment is one of the most difficult to enter,
due to lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Though this has been widely
acknowledged in the country, nothing has been done to improve the situation.
Perhaps institutional difficulties create opportunities for the government to use
its negotiating power with foreign entrants besides offering protection to local
firms.  
Rather than being rational, the decision to support foreign investment is a
political one. Such decisions are not taken in a vacuum, but are embedded in
political ideologies and government preferences on how economic and social
development should take place. Some decisions taken by governments are also
likely to be taken in the context of international relations. This is the case of
Chinese investment in Latin America. The impressive growth in trade relations
between China and Latin America has been largely attributed to complemen -
tary interests of firms and governments in both regions. Li (2007) suggests that
Latin America is critical for China. The two major objectives of the Chinese
government are to obtain raw materials for continuing economic growth and to
maintain access to export markets for its manufacturing products. Further -
more, alliances with the countries in the region are crucial in providing safe
access to the Panama Canal, an important route for oil supply to China (Li 2007).
This seems to be a case in which the firms and governments of both local and
host countries possess mutually desirable resources. 
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As a political action, support for acquisitions of local firms may be subject to
protectionist policies and nationalist visions. The brief case below provides an
example of a dispute involving Chinese and North American firms and their
respective governments: actors with high bargaining power. He and Lyles (2008)
suggest that there is some concern by the USA administration regarding
Chinese foreign investment and the extent to which the strategies of these firms
are imbued with the political goals of the Chinese government. The uneasiness
is not so much with the government support some of these firms enjoy, but with
the fact that many of the large ones are part- / majority-owned by the govern -
ment; the more so if strategic sectors are involved. The authors cite the CNOOC
bid for Unocal, one of the largest American companies in California. An
interesting point was the attraction of rivals, such as Chevron, into the fray.
Perhaps as a result of the latter’s intensive lobbying, the case was taken up by the
Bush administration and Congress. The decision to investigate the national
security implications of the Chinese bid resulted in its withdrawal. Another
more recent example is the Huawei bid for 3Com in 2008 which was refused on
the grounds that the military was the majority owner of the company
(Bloomberg Business Week, 2008, February 21). The Huawei bid for Motorola has
also been under scrutiny by the American government (Global Times China,
2008 April 6). An interesting point about these cases is that, though companies
strive for legitimacy from both internal and external sources, so also do
governments. 
Another way in which governments can exert bargaining power is by
defining the conditions under which foreign companies are granted property
rights. In a business relationship, it is unlikely that either the firm or its external
parties can use direct coercion to force an event, although not impossible. An
example is when the government of Ecuador in 2008 made the decision to seize
the operations of the Brazilian multinational, Odebrecht in Ecuador under
allegations of failure to meet the terms of a contract on the construction of a
hydroelectric plant. Not only had the government sent the army to seize the site,
but issued an order for detention of the company’s senior management (BBC
Brazil.com 2008, October 19). Host governments are able to control the appro -
priation of value by a firm indirectly, through taxation, adverse regulations or
other agreements (Henisz and Zelner 2005), and directly through changing the
conditions for property rights. 
Expropriation of assets was a major concern of companies and an important
theme in the international business literature of the 1970s and 1980s, but has
become less of an issue as host-country attitudes towards FDI have softened.
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Nevertheless, the threat of government constraints on their core activities is still
a major concern for companies investing in less developed or closed regimes. An
interesting example is the initiative of the Bolivian government to nationalize
the assets of foreign oil and gas companies. The Brazilian oil gas giant Petrobras
was forced to reduce its ownership stake and has lost billions in share value since
it became Petrobras Bolivia (BBC News, 2006, May 11). A common tactic of Latin
American countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela is to appeal to ideology and
nationalism to justify revision of policies regarding foreign investment.   
Another example is the dispute between the internet search engine and
services provider, Google, and the Chinese government. When Google entered
China, it was on the understanding that it was better to have censored activity
there than none at all. The company has now decided to keep its servers only in
Hong Kong, following discovery of an attack on its servers by Chinese hackers.
This withdrawal has lost customers and created space for competitors (New York
Times, 2010, March 29). Regarding this event, the observation by Microsoft
founder Bill Gates that “You’ve got to decide: do you want to obey the laws of the
countries you are in, or not? If not, you may not end up doing business there”,
reveals the critical need to adapt to the institutional environment of the host
country, no matter how the identity of the company is affected. Political skill can
also be critical for business performance abroad but making such decisions does
not exempt firms from responsibility towards other stakeholders.  
These accounts illustrate how governments can exert their legitimate right
to change the rules of engagement for foreign businesses. Google was
confronted with the quite extraordinary historic power of the communist
regime and tradition of government intervention and ownership in business
and industry (New York Times, 23 March 2010). As Redding and Witt observe
(2007: 43), “the assumption that only a central government power was
appropriate was implanted from the beginning and has survived to the present
day”. Multinationals, by contrast, count on their expertise and capacity to
provide unique resources. Ultimately for Petrobras and Google, this was not
enough to protect their identity in their host countries. The comment by Bill
Gates reveals how politics enters the relationships between firms and
governments and suggests, furthermore, that the bargaining power of the latter
inheres in the certainty of finding competitors and transferring rights to them. 
The easier it is to find a substitute for a firm specific advantage, the greater its
vulnerability (Hickson et al 1971), especially within a volatile institutional context.
This is further illustrated by my current study of a Brazilian MNC. Despite heavy
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initial investment in a prospective project in Africa, the explora tion rights were in
the end given to an influential Chinese competitor. In the battle for a place in
foreign markets, firms cannot use any kind of material persuasion, even if they
have the resources. Matters of personal ethics and internal institutional
constraints intervene. As Kostova and Zaheer (1999) suggest, achieving a balance
in internal and external acceptability is a challenge for MNCs. The line between
material inducements and forms of undue influence can be blurred and is crossed
on a daily basis in some institutional environ ments.  
The exertion of undue influence to obtain preferential government treat -
ment or inside knowledge is not confined to firms from developing economies,
as illustrated by a recent case involving BAE. The allegation that the company
had secretly paid Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia more than £1bn in connection
with Britain’s biggest ever weapons contract led to an investigation by the
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (BBC New 2010, February 5). Other examples abound,
such as Siemens and the Chinese prosecution of Rio Tinto employees (New York
Times 2010, 29 March). This latter case hit the headlines when certain company
executives were sentenced to prison following allegations of stealing state
secrets and bribing state officials from the Chinese Iron and Steel Associations
when negotiating iron ore prices. The arrests occurred in the context of an attack
by the Chinese government on corruption, which also affected Chinese
companies, but it has been viewed by pundits as retaliation for the rejection of a
bid by Chincalco to invest $19 million in Rio Tinto. 
There is some suggestion in the literature that most political business
associations develop in countries with weak institutions. The latter have been
identified with high levels of corruption and generally low levels of enforce ment.
Corruption flourishes where a state fails to enforce the rule of law and does not
have the mechanisms to control its own bureaucrats or protect property and
contract rights (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankernan 2000). 
My general contention in this lecture is that relationships between govern -
ments and firms are still poorly understood, despite the recent burgeoning
interest in this topic. I will now set out the current challenges this issue poses to
scholars in international business. I would go further and consider, first of all,
how governments and institutions together create different environments (or
‘systems’) for firms in the countries where they operate. Second, I want to
explore the implications of those environments for the kind of relational
frameworks that embed firms in host countries. International firms participate
in these frameworks by socially and politically interacting with local actors.
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5. New challenges  
Acknowledging the role of institutions is central to the understanding of the
international business environment, as has become increasingly evident by the
publication of a special issue by the Journal of International Business Studies
(JIBS) on this theme (Journal of International Business Studies, 2008).  
Through this lecture I have put forward the view that past and current
research has approached the environment in a monolithic way,i.e.as‘the market’.
We have seen a refinement in scholarly conceptions of the environment, with
the idea of psychic distance (at least in its multidimensional form) and later with
the adoption of institutional perspectives on the environment. International
business theories and work on varieties of capitalism have also advanced the
concept of the environment; by looking into the way the institutional system
through formal incentives and sanctions empowers particular actors in
different countries. Within these perspectives, liberal economies, for example,
encourage the actors involved in economic transactions to make decisions
based on self-serving interests without much interference from the state
(Whitley 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001). Other systems foster relationships
between different types of business actor, such as banks and firms in Germany
and Japan (Lane and Probert 2009). In countries whose institutions are highly
heterogeneous and fail to provide an overarching framework, coordination
issues are resolved at a group level (Krug and Hendrichke 2010). 
Thus, institutions are relevant to business in respect of the legal frameworks
they provide and whether these are sustained by mechanisms of enforcement.
Governments are important to institutions, not only in defining their structure
and design, but also by making sure that rules are applied. This capacity to
enforce matters most when institutions are weak. A society is deemed to have
ineffective institutions when the system is incomplete in terms of the
comprehensiveness of its regulations, including its consistency in applying
these regulations (North 1990). As Williamson (1975) suggest, most institutional
systems are incomplete; it is impossible to specify all possible contingencies in
contracts, either because of bounded rationality or cost. One implication of this
reasoning is that a great many economic exchanges are left to implicit
agreements between the parties. This means that behavioural control, instead
of happening at the level of formal institutions, depends on informal rules of
behaviour, the culture of norms and the values that emerge at the level of
organizations or relational frameworks (Scott 1995). Government is important
to this equation because it has the authority and power to address institutional
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failures. In institutionally weak countries that are also politically instable, the
equilibrium which could otherwise be found at the level of informal groups may
not occur as coalitions fragment.  
Governments, however, are not the same as institutions (Peters 2001). The
former rise and fall, but the latter may persist through social internalization and
enforcement (Berger and Luckmann1966). Governments, moreover, vary in their
capacity to fulfil mandates. The stability of governments is important in so far as
it lends legitimacy to the institutional system (DiMaggio 1991). In theory,
governments as actors can legitimately exercise strategic choice in situations of
institutional incompleteness and in the absence of formal mechanisms of
enforcement. It can opt for the enforcement of compliance with universalistic
rules even in the absence of such rules, or it can leave room for vested interests
to decide. 
Institutional consistency and government stability
Taking these reflections into account, I want to propose two frameworks for
future investigation. The first considers the stability of governments according
to their degree of political cohesion and the kind of political relationships that
are likely to develop between international firms and host governments. The
second considers institutional effectiveness in host countries: the degree of
codification and enforcement present in different societies and the kind of
relational frameworks in which international firms are likely to interact in these
societies. 
One definition of political instability is ‘a situation where a coalition in
gover nance is constantly replaced’. This is in general viewed as harmful to
business, in the sense that it tends to introduce greater uncertainty and
unfamiliar risks. Some studies have questioned whether political instability
may be worse for business than autocratic governments (Li 2005), because the
latter are prone to encourage monopoly power. If a firm makes above normal
gains from monopolistic activity, it may be tempted to excise undue influence in
order to protect its comparative advantage (Fligstein 2001; Shleifer and Vishny
1997). Government stability is so important to business that the Economist
Intelligence Unit undertakes detailed monitoring of political environments
across nations. This raises the question of the role national governments play in
papering over institutional gaps.
Institutional consistency matters to business insofar as it denotes the
separation of the legal system from political interference and an adherence to
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universalistic and ethical principles. Transparency is essential to the process of
implementing rules and norms. The World Bank’s annual ranking of the “Ease of
Doing Business” in terms of ten indicators applied to 183 countries provides an
indirect assessment of institutional maturity as opposed to weakness, insofar as
immature institutions usually beset firms with complications and uncer -
tainties, which are often associated with corruption and/or political inter -
ference.
This analysis suggests that host countries present different configurations
of governmental stability and institutional consistency. With a view to illustra -
ting rather than to providing clear and definite answers to these issues, I
propose in Table 1 four contextual configurations presented by different combi -
na tions of political and institutional conditions. I have chosen four countries to
illustrate these configurations. In Table 1, the top-left quadrant represents a
situation where governments are stable and institutions relatively consistent.
The USA is a case in point. The USA epitomizes the arm’s-length system, in which
the initiatives of individual entrepreneurial actors are protected from state
intervention. Separation between regulators and the regulated together with a
bureaucratic system which is predicated on impersonal and universalistic rules
empower individual economic actors (Hofstede 1991). The differentiation of the
administration from the political system should ideally guarantee that
administrators engage in policy-making without the interference of politicians
making particularistic demands (Peters 2001). Yet its fragmented political
system offers business actors numerous opportunities to exert influence over
politicians and bureaucrats. As Barley (2010) notes, firms influence the govern -
ment through several interconnected organizations: a network created specifi -
cally for this purpose. Lobbying activities occur at several levels. Though there
are several ways in which firms can influence the government, the strong
democratic values and moral barriers to corruption prevent undue modes of
influence from becoming endemic. Though American firms have constructed
several types of organization aimed specifically at influencing governments,
together with complex systems for lobbying, this activity is highly regulated and
relatively transparent in compari son with some European countries.  
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Table 1: Relational frameworks in different political and institutional conditions
LEVEL OF POLITICAL STABILITY 
High  Low 
High   United States China
Economic relations: primarily Economic relations: highly embedded  
market-based encourage individual in social relations and shaped by 
initiative,  with little interference by political  objectives
government
Contracts: established impersonally and Contracts: established through guanxi 
maintained through formal contract and maintained through personal trust
within an embedded legal framework and commitment
Decision making on business-related Decision making on business-related 
policies: political system clearly policies: significant role of 
separated from the institutional system; particularism; channels of influence 
separation between regulators and are personal and largely private
regulated.
Still room for political influence through 
publicly recognized channels.
Low   Belgium Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic relations: primarily Economic relations: deeply embedded  
market-based but subject to satisfaction in social relations and shaped  by 
of community interests (Flanders vs, personal or factional (often  tribal) 
Wallonia) objectives. 
Contracts: established impersonally and Contracts: established through
maintained through formal contract. informal understandings and 
Comparatively well-established maintained through personal pay-offs. 
bureaucracies Maintenance depends on whether 
another faction gains control.
Decision making on business-related Decision making on business-related 
policies: increasingly politicized in the policies: highly particularistic; 
context of conflicting demands of the channels of influence are personal and 
country’s two main communities.  secret. High instability of governments
Low government power due to national 
divisions and self-contained 
communities
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The top-right quadrant represents China. Despite the fears expressed over its
future, the Chinese government at the present time is stable, through a pervasive
one-party system. Institutions in China are known nevertheless for being arbitrary
and personalist. Though many argue that the guanxi system in Chinese business is
less of a force than before, it persists through its cultural embeddedness. The main
problem in China is the ambiguous role exercised by government agencies, which
in many cases are also market players. Although the Chinese legal framework
appears institutionally incomplete and highly inconsistent, disputes, if they arise,
can usually be resolved within relational frameworks. Secure participation in
business projects is frequently safeguarded by informal rules that arise from
private deals between players, as noted by Krug and Hendrichke (2010). There is
also some suggestion that the transference of the assets of State Owned Enter -
prises to private hands has been defined in the context of networks with state
officials and is characterized by a lack of transparency (Fligstein 2001). The lack of
consistency in the application of rules leaves ample room for favouritism.  
The quadrant below left can be represented by Belgium. This country has an
inherent political instability because of tensions between the French-speaking
Walloons in the South and the Dutch-speaking Flemish in the north. Belgium
has two parallel political systems, with different parties standing for different
proposals, each having limited power to implement an overall programme. The
professional public bureaucracy is governed on the criteria of merit but the deep
political and cultural divisions in society encourages clientage and patronage as
mechanisms for maintaining the integrity and power of the two major parties.
The introduction of federalism, by establishing a clear demarcation of political
powers, resulted in the segmentation of decision-making. It is alleged also to
have fostered idiosyncratic links between business and government. Because
power is segmented and politicians have very little power beyond their own
constituencies, this paradoxically, tends to constrain exercise of undue influence
on the autho rities (Maiesschalck and Van den Wallen 2009). There is also some
speculation that cultural divisions create different attitudes towards relation -
ships between firms and government officials, or whether the French and Dutch
parts of the country have distinct tolerance levels concerning corruption
(Maiesschalck and Van den Wallen 2009).  
Most sub-Saharan African countries would fit well in the quadrant below
right. Here we have a situation where both weak governments and weak
institutions prevail; they are unable to perform basic functions, even the
collection of taxes, which is apparent in the opportunistic or abusive actions of
officials (Fligstein 2001). In fragile situations, the state may be lacking in basic
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legitimacy and/or the capacity to implement programmes that will attract
some firms, but may scare off others (Batley 2010). Where the government is
immature and unstable and institutions fail to control bureaucrats and
property laws, corruption thrives and firms attempt to secure super-normal
profits. This encourages situations of ‘state capture’ (Soreide 2009), in which
firms are tempted to shape rules by giving backhanders to public officials. The
use of political influence by a firm distorts both the legal framework and the
policymaking process for its own individual benefit. A PhD student of mine, who
is a senior manager in an African company, states that in order to keep its
contract it has to maintain close relations with its military partner, who has the
power to terminate the agreement at any time he wants,with no legal sanctions.
It is common to find company-owning officials in host countries where both
government and institutions are weak, establishing particularistic relations
with firms through such holdings. 
In an initial test of these ideas, I have taken data from the World Competitive -
ness Report 2008 and plotted it on the two dimensions of political instability
and institutional consistency (Figure 1). This shows Nigeria as having a combina -
tion of lower levels of institutional consistency and political stability, while the
USA has higher levels of both. China is at the lower end of institutional consis -
tency but shows high governmental stability. Belgium is a country that is diffi -
cult to define: it is low in governmental stability but not so low in consistency. 
Figure 1: Political Stability vs. Institutional Consistency
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Institutional and relational frameworks in different national contexts
A further refinement of this analysis considers the different combinations of
institutional codes, the existence of a codified system of rules and the formal
mechanisms that ensure their accomplishment and the way in which they may
give rise to relational frameworks. Figure 2, extends Boisot and Child's (1996)
analyses of different forms of capitalism, by comparing  the strength of institu -
tions with a state’s capacity to enforce institutional practices across the board.
Again, it serves to illustrate the relevance of relationships between firms and
governments in different institutional contexts. The top right of the figure
represents countries whose business systems are largely dominated by strong,
state bureaucracies; evidence as to their economic consequences points in
different directions. Evans (1995) points out that educated bureaucracies tend to
enhance economic growth. Where state bureaucracies are combined with
political monopoly or autocratic regimes, however, high levels of corruption and
the misallocation of resources can result (Fligstein 2001; Faccio 2006; Li 2005).
Some studies suggest that state bureaucratic regimes are less inclined to
protect property rights and tend to introduce nationalist policies, with
consequences for asset appropriation or nationalization (Henisz and Zelner
2005). Some recent examples of state bureaucracies can be found in Latin
America, namely Bolivia and Venezuela. Though Brazil is now an established
democracy and offers a well-developed apparatus of protection in respect of
property rights, it is still a country with high barriers to entry, due to its complex
array of highly codified regulations. Interpretations of, and adaptation to,
bureaucratic constraints imply high transaction costs, and create multiple
windows for undue influence (Child, Rodrigues and Frynas 2009). 
Figure 2: Institutional and relational frameworks in different national context
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Fiefs represent networks founded on personal relationships and, sometimes,
charismatic leaders; they are common in sub-Saharan Africa. Usually they
develop in small towns or villages where the leader extracts revenues from
personal relationships (Donleavy and Stewart 1995; Bull and Newell 2003). Other
types of relational framework common to this part of Africa are the so-called
‘para’ institutions, which can sometimes regulate the informal economy (Nate
2006). Relational frameworks may emerge on the basis of kinship, religion or
tribal values. Divided societies are common mainly in the sub-Saharan states,
such as Nigeria. Such societies are characterised by political instability and the
lack of a unifying institutional framework. Under these conditions, fiefs, tribes
and ‘para’ institutional organizations take over some state functions through
patronage. Such networks establish their own linkages between the state and
local communities. Because the state is not accountable to society in a situation
of poverty and huge income differentials, patronage becomes the main
organizing principle. As it evolves, patronage thus takes over some functions
which should be the preserve of the state. Because Nigeria is rich in oil, trans -
actions in these networks are defined by a hierarchy of actors who are able to
secure high gains from opportunistic behaviour (Nate 2006). Weak institutional
environments tend to yield high returns, usually from leverage, taxation and
market power (Faccio 2006). These relational frameworks facilitate the develop -
ment of private power, i.e. ‘state capture’, where rule-making depends mostly on
the political actors involved (Soreide 2009). This context facilitates the
development of ‘captor firms’: generally larger organizations that use their
relationships with politicians to influence laws and regulations via private
payments to public officials (Hellman et al. 2000). This kind of situation can,
however, impose considerable costs on a firm. Research I am currently
undertaking on a Brazilian multinational and its subsidiaries in an African
country indicates how often it has to negotiate with actors of different types in
order to pursue its exploration activities. The complexity and uncertainty
created by having to negotiate with the chiefs and religious leaders of local
tribes has obliged the company to re-evaluate and re-programme its activities
on the continent. The dynamics of relational frameworks described above tends
to be associated with that we may call ‘crony capitalism’, the widespread
personalism, favouritism implied in firm-government relations (Kang 2003).
Clans and network capitalism typify relational frameworks in China. Though
China has in recent years moved towards a market system, its institutional
framework has not kept pace. It has yet to develop a fully codified bureaucratic
order (Boisot, Child and Redding 2010). Institutions are not completely
independent of political and business relations, while contracts are still
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established in a context of interpersonal accommodation and trust. Property
rights are varied and complex, giving rise to different forms of capitalism within
the same country (Boisot, Child and Redding 2010). They are defined by a context
in which the notion of profit-sharing between the business community and
local government agents is significant (Krug and Hendrischke 2010). In China it
is difficult to distinguish between actors from inside networks and those from
outside ones (Boisot and Child 1996). Notions of ‘insidership’ and ‘outsidership’
are not as clear cut as Johanson and Vahlne (2009) would suggest. Bureaucrats
in China are not only regulators but also active business players. As Krug and
Hendrischke (2010) points out, this creates a situation in which rules vary
between industries and localities, which in turn gives rise to different types of
market design. Boisot et al (2010) distinguish three types of local partner in
relational frameworks that may be relevant to foreign firms considering
entering, or already established in, China’s markets: the state sector, which
controls important assets and is highly motivated by nationalistic values; local
corporations, which engage in local competition and opportunism: and the
private sector, which is defined by a tight network based on entrepreneurship,
secrecy and loyalty. The characteristics of relational frameworks in China reflect
the so-called ‘network capitalism’, in which economic transactions are
embedded in the context of groups and their relations with other groups, and in
which trust and reciprocity play an important part in the dynamic.
The modernization hypothesis assumes that societies tend to change from
particularism to universalism and from fiefs to markets, then to bureaucratic
states and finally to market forms. Market systems are based on impersonal
economic relationships between decentralized and self-regulatory units (Boisot
and Child 1996). An important characteristic of the ideal / archetypal market
system is that relationships are governed primarily by self-interest. Markets are
efficient when supported by universalistic laws and not subjected to political
interference or collusion (Hall and Soscike 2001). This is the Anglo-Saxon ideal-
type of 'market capitalism'. 
This conceptualization highlights the kind of relational frameworks firms
are likely to encounter in different institutional international environments.
These frameworks can offer several avenues for analyzing the context of inter -
na tio nalization in a much more dynamic way: one that is informed by different
markets, institutions and political behaviours of key actors.   
Developing these ideas further is a challenge I intend to pursue as Professor
of International Business and Organization. What I have just outlined is the
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terrain for the research questions I would like to see being investigated by the
Erasmus Centre for Emerging Economies. Until now I have mainly focused on the
case of multinational corporations. However, many small firms have internatio -
nalized today, at least through exporting, and you may be wondering whether
such firms can influence governments and what kind of relationships they
might develop with the host institutions (such as the courts and customs
authorities) that impinge on their international activities. While large firms can
bring their individual bargaining power to bear on governments and institu -
tions, small ones may be able to exert influence only through association with
other firms, through forming cooperatives and partnerships, issues which have
significantly been developed at RSM by Barbara Krug, and Rob van Tulder (van
Tulder, and Fortanier,  2009). 
My plan is to develop a complementary theme that could bridge the streams
of research already being undertaken at the School, through investigating the
internationalization of the small firm from the perspective of social innovation.
Henk Volberda and Frans van de Borsh define social innovation as the trans -
formative capacity of managers. Coming from a co-evolutionary tradition, as
they do, I would suggest that social innovation is an important political factor in
co-evolution, for it can be mobilized through the relational frameworks
constructed by firms across their organizational boundaries. 
Social innovation is relevant to small firms in both traditional and high-tech
sectors, enabling them to surmount hurdles that might otherwise bar their
global market entry and/or integration. When firms take advantage of an
environment where both technical and social innovation thrive, such as Silicon
Valley, this may in the longer term contribute to the shape the industry and its
reputation (Granovetter 1985). The concept of social innovation has been applied
in several ways and with reference, inter alia, to firms, networks, social
movements and various organizational processes: for example, the capacity of
firms to meet social needs. The definition I adopt is close to the one proposed by
Mulgan et al (2007) and embodies two elements: (1) new combinations of
existing relational frameworks that cut across organizational boundaries; and
(2) the development of new social relationships between discrete individuals
and/or groups.  
In order to illustrate the usefulness of this concept in considering the entry
of SMEs into international markets, I would refer to some Brazilian networks
that have already drawn the attention of scholars and institutional authorities
alike (Cassiolato 2003; Cavalcanti 2006). These are tight local communities
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organized around product manufacture and production processes. Some of
these successful networks have been able to attract different players to the
region, such as national and international banks and also migrant firms from
other states. These networks, which were initially centered on small towns in
isolated areas, now exhibit different configurations in their inter-organizational
arrangements, some with a predominantly market orientation involving banks,
large domestic firms and multinationals, while others are state-led and include
small firms, cooperatives and educational institutions. Data from the Brazilian
Department of Industry and Commerce indicate that there are around 800 such
networks covering different sectors, which demonstrate varying degrees of local
embeddedness and modes of government support.  
The first example I have in mind is Projecto Jaiba, located in the state of
Minas Gerais (Araujo, Godrim and Souza 2007). It was established in the early
1970s, to improve the irrigation of a semi-arid region in the north of the region,
thereby creating the conditions for integrating localized farms and businesses
into state economic activities. At its inception, the project received funds from
the Inter-American Development Bank, and more recently from the World Bank.
Other financial institutions were attracted to the project, including the Japan
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). As work progressed, large ICT firms
also entered the picture, applying their state-of-the-art competences to total
quality management (TQM). Within the Jaiba community, cooperatives of small
farmers have been created, with a view to protecting their operations and
reducing the costs of new technologies, raw materials and marketing. These
cooperatives also fulfill additional functions, such as educating their members
in relevant aspects of business and trade. Jaiba has several such associations,
although it would appear that some are not working well due to difficulties in
establishing cooperation and mutual trust among individual farmers. The
relevance of this case for international business is the fact that many of these
community-based networks are now turning their interests to global markets.
Jaiba’s exportation of just one fruit, lime, amounts to around two millions
Brazilian reals and the estimates suggest that these figures will tend to more
the double for 2011. 
Research into similar organizational arrangements, such as those in Vale do
Sao Francisco,reveals that members of such networks have learned management
practices comparable to those of efficient private firms, i.e. aggressive marketing,
tight costing and the implementation of production control systems (Cavalcanti
and Neiman 2006). As Vale do Sao Francisco network expanded and
incorporated actors of various types, such as international supermarkets,
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trading companies and national and international certification agencies,
pressure increased for improved management processes and quality control.
Some cooperatives innovated by using personal and formal methods of quality
control, such as virtual programmes to monitor and manage production
practices. Other strategies of social organization have allowed small firms to
integrate into the global market through exporting or other advanced forms of
internationalization. Examples include the formation of monitoring groups and
encouragement to join relevant national and international associations.  
Integration into such heterogeneous networks paves the way for participa -
tion in global supply chains, but a consequence of such engagement is the
requirement to comply with norms of certification agencies, through strict
control of routines. Grading and standardization, however, are new processes for
these producers, associations and cooperatives (Cavalcanti 2006). As the
community-based networks grow through the incorporation of actors with new
forms of ownership and enhance the modes of association between local
participants, more efficient forms of organizing are invented, but with two
contrasting outcomes: some firms are integrated swiftly into the global market,
while others remain excluded. These latter firms can then find themselves
becoming increasingly disconnected from their local community. Many small
farmers who are unable to meet the requirements of national and international
certification agencies may well encounter barriers to continued membership of
their cooperatives.
How have the above points clarified the concept of social innovation? The
Jaiba case demonstrates that this dynamic can have a positive effect on small
firms by creating sustainable business for them through integrating them into
global markets. This in turn can trigger a growth cycle for these individual firms.
It can, however, also exclude some of them, including late developers.  While the
criteria of entry into cooperatives and other networks become more closely
correlated with those of certification agencies, the networks may ironically
become less friendly to locals.
How would research focused on social innovation enrich our understanding
of international business? The fact that local communities are, by their very
nature, geographically contained facilitates the identification of network
boundaries, although such a study would present at least one more challenge:
namely, the identification of the various combinations of inter-firm relations,
including those with the state and its institutions. A focus on social innovation
sheds light on the types of association most likely to bind together actors with
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complementary skills and foster the integration of small firms into the regional,
perhaps even the international, economy. The state and international institu -
tions would appear to have an important role in steering the invisible hand of
the market so that social innovation also addresses social needs. 
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6. Final remarks
This reflection takes us back to the initial objective of my lecture, which was
to elaborate on the political dimension of the international evolution of firms
and in particular to discuss how firms shape their environment. I came to the
conclusion that, while large firms may, through the power they possess, change
institutions and shape markets, small firms can only aspire to influence
governments, mainly by means of social innovation. Through collective organi -
za tion these firms are able to build inter-organizational frameworks that may
connect them to those in power.
Apart from endowing small firms with the power of mobilization, social
innovation provides them with representational legitimacy. Because social
innovation constructs an environment that builds upon local resources in order
to gain the support of institutions and attract private organizations and
governments as partners, this attractiveness provides them with sources of
bargaining power. It gives the small a voice. Besides, social innovation is an
attrac tion for important allies who can bring complementarities and strengthen
the power of local actors. These are becoming social movements. For example,
Fair Trade and other movements associated with ‘greens’ and ‘cleans’ add further
strength to local collective efforts to integrate into global markets. 
Social innovation can also be a mechanism of defense for the small firm
against the all-consuming power of large players. I would like to close by
stressing the relevance of social innovation in its role as a political force that has
the power to transform social and economic environments. If governments of
emerging economies are canny, they will take advantage of the opportunities
offered by the global market by helping their local firms and other producers to
build an environment which welcomes the small and unconnected, thus
encouraging an internationalization movement that also meets social needs.   
I do hope that the thoughts and reflections I have shared with you today have
conveyed the excitement I feel at contributing to the work of the Rotterdam
School of Management. The proposed agenda for research that I have outlined
will, I hope, create a robust platform on which to build further, diversified
studies into the internationalization – and concomitant politicization – of
organizations. 
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Suzana B. Rodrigues is Professor of International Business and Organization at the Strategy
Department, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and Scientific Director of
the Erasmus Centre for Emerging Economies [ECEE]. Her research focus on understanding inter -
na tional business in emerging economies, with particular reference to Brazilian multinationals
and small firms, and their relationships with local and host countries. Prior to joining Erasmus
University, Suzana was Professor of International Management and Organization at UFMG, Brazil
and at Birmingham University, UK. She is a visiting fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge and
visiting scholar at FUMEC University, Brazil. Suzana received the Terry Book Award from the AOM
for an outstanding contribution to management knowledge. She has published several books
and articles in peer reviewed journals in international business, corporate governance and
organization studies. 
The focus of this lecture is on the relationships between firms and governments and their
respective bargaining power in their strategy to access foreign market. It suggests that these
relationships can take different forms depending on the configuration taken by host environ -
ments, (i.e. combination of government and institutional maturity). Host country environments
that are characterized by political stability and institutional maturity offer less opportunities for
idiosyncratic relationships between firms and governments, while environments defined by
weak institutions and unstable governments present the fertile ground for political inter -
ference in business strategies. The lecture concludes by comparing large firms with small and
medium-sized firms, which despite having little bargaining power on their own, may be
capable to enhance their position in foreign markets through inter-organizational relations
with other firms and institutions. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder zoek -
 school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School
of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by ERIM is
focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm rela -
tions, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management contain written texts of inaugural addres -
ses by members of ERIM. The addresses are available in two ways, as printed hardcopy
booklet and as digital fulltext file through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal.
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